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3EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On 11 March 2011, a devastating earthquake struck Japan and caused a major
nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. The disaster confirmed that
nuclear reactors must be protected even against accidents that have been assessed
as highly unlikely. It also revealed a well-known catalogue of problems: faulty design,
insufficient back-up systems, human error, inadequate contingency plans, and poor
communications. The catastrophe triggered the rapid launch of a major re-examina-
tion of nuclear reactor security in Europe.
It also stopped in its tracks what had appeared to be a ‘nuclear renaissance’, both in
Europe and globally, especially in the emerging countries. Under the accumulated
pressure of rising demand and climate warming, many new nuclear projects had
been proposed. Since 2011 there has been more ambivalence, especially in Europe.
Some Member States have even decided to abandon the nuclear sector altogether.
This Egmont Paper aims to examine the reactions of the EU regarding nuclear safety
since 2011. Firstly, a general description of the nuclear sector in Europe is provided.
The nuclear production of electricity currently employs around 500,000 people,
including those working in the supply chain. It generates approximately €70 billion
per year. It provides roughly 30% of the electricity consumed in the EU. At the end of
2013, there were 131 nuclear power reactors active in the EU, located in 14
countries. Four new reactors are under construction in France, Slovakia and Finland.
Secondly, this paper will present the Euratom legal framework regarding nuclear
safety. The European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom) Treaty was
signed in 1957, and somewhat obscured by the European Economic Community
(EEC) Treaty. It was a more classical treaty, establishing institutions with limited
powers. Its development remained relatively modest until the Chernobyl
catastrophe, which provoked many initiatives. The most important was the final
adoption of the Nuclear Safety Directive 2009/71. Thirdly, the general symbiosis
between Euratom and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will be
explained. Fourthly, the paper analyses the initiatives taken by the EU in the wake of
the Fukushima catastrophe. These initiatives are centred around the famous ‘stress
tests’.
Fifthly, the most important legal change brought about by this event was the revision
of Directive 2009/71. Directive 2014/87 has been adopted quite rapidly, and has
deepened in various ways the role of the EU in nuclear safety. It has reinforced the
role and effective independence of the national regulatory authorities. It has
enhanced transparency on nuclear safety matters. It has strengthened principles,
and introduced new general nuclear safety objectives and requirements, addressing
specific technical issues across the entire life cycle of nuclear installations, and in
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particular, nuclear power plants. It has extended monitoring and the exchange of
experiences by establishing a European system of peer reviews. Finally, it has estab-
lished a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonized nuclear safety guidelines.
In spite of these various improvements, Directive 2014/87 Euratom still reflects the
ambiguity of the Euratom system in general, and especially in the field of nuclear
safety. The use of nuclear energy remains controversial among Member States.
Some of them remain adamantly in favour, others against or ambivalent. The inter-
vention of the EAEC institutions remains sensitive. The use of the traditional Commu-
nity method remains limited. The peer review method remains a very peculiar
mechanism that deserves more attention.
5INTRODUCTION
On 11 March 2011, a devastating earthquake struck Japan and caused a major
nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. This disaster confirmed that
nuclear reactors must be protected even against accidents that have been assessed
as highly unlikely. It also revealed a well-known catalogue of problems: faulty design,
insufficient back-up systems, human error, inadequate contingency plans, and poor
communications. The catastrophe triggered the rapid launch of a major re-examina-
tion of nuclear reactor security in Europe.
It also stopped in its tracks what had appeared to be a ‘nuclear renaissance’, both in
Europe and globally, especially in the emerging countries.1 Under the accumulated
pressure of rising demand and climate warming, many new nuclear projects had
been proposed. Since 2011 there has been more ambivalence, especially in Europe.
Some Member States have even decided to abandon the nuclear sector altogether.
In March 2011, the European Council instantaneously approved the Commission’s
proposal to organize ‘stress tests’ (note the worrying parallel in terminology with a
damaged banking sector). These tests have produced lengthy reports and now a new
Directive. The present synthesis briefly examines the state of nuclear energy in the
EU (§ 1), its legal framework (§ 2), the cooperation between the EU and the IAEA
(§ 3), the EU’s reaction after Fukushima (§ 4), and the new provisions of the 2014
Directive on the safety of nuclear installations (§ 5).
Franklin DEHOUSSE
With the collaboration of Didier VERHOEVEN2
1 W. Nuttall, Nuclear Renaissance: Technologies and policies for the future of nuclear power, Taylor & Francis,
2005.
For a smart and balanced introduction to this sensitive topic, see C. Ferguson, Nuclear Energy: What
everyone needs to know, OUP USA, 2011.
2 F. Dehousse is professor (in abeyance) at the University of Liège and judge at the General Court of the Court
of Justice of the EU. D. Verhoeven is assistant at the General Court. This Paper reflects solely their personal
views. The text was updated until 30 October 2014.
71. THE STATE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE EU
Although sometimes overlooked, the EU’s nuclear sector currently employs about
500,000 people, including those working in the supply chain. It generates approxi-
mately €70 billion in revenue per year. It provides roughly 30% of the electricity
consumed in the EU.3 This electricity is stable, secure from a supply perspective, CO2-
free, and affordable. On the other hand, the insurance costs of possible damage
remain hypothetical, and the treatment of waste unresolved.
Between 1995 and 2012, the share of nuclear power generation followed a
downward trend. In many Member States, broader public opinion, especially after
the two most serious power plant incidents in history (Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukus-
hima in 2011), was not favourable to nuclear power generation. Germany and
Belgium have decided to gradually close existing nuclear power plants, while Italy
decided not to restart its nuclear power programme, which was abandoned in the
1980s after the Chernobyl catastrophe. In France, however, nuclear will continue
playing an important role in the longer term, even if the present government has
decided to reduce progressively its contribution to electricity production.4
At the end of 2013, there were 131 nuclear power reactors active in the EU. The 131
reactors are located in 14 countries. Four new reactors are under construction in
France, Slovakia and Finland.
Source: Euratom Supply Agency (ESA)5
3 For a general overview, see M. Schneider and A. Froggatt, The world nuclear industry status report 2014,
SES/H. Boll Foundation, 2014.
4 See Commission staff working document (SWD) In-depth study of European Energy Security – SWD(2014)
330 final/3 – 2.7.2014 – p. 90
Belgium 7
Bulgaria 2
Czech Republic 6
Finland 4 (1)
France 58 (1)
Germany 9
Hungary 4
Netherlands 1
Romania 2
Slovakia 4 (2)
Slovenia/Croatia* 1
Spain 7
Sweden 10
United Kingdom 16
Total 131 (4)
5 The Euratom Supply Agency was established by the Euratom Treaty, and has been operating since 1960.
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With 58 active nuclear reactors, France has almost 45% of all EU nuclear power
reactors on its territory, and in 2013, nuclear energy represented 73% of the
electricity generated in the country.6 In terms of electricity production, the 58 active
nuclear reactors in France have a net production of 403,703 GWh, or a share of 48.6%
of the 831,050 GWh of total electricity generated by nuclear energy in the 28 EU
Member States. In 2013, nuclear electricity production accounted for 26.9% of total
EU production.7
Most of the reactors in the EU are 20 or more years old.
6 Source: Euratom Supply Agency – Annual report 2013.
Nuclear power share of total electricity production in 2013
Source: ESA annual report 2013
7 Source: Eurostat – Electricity Statistics 2013 – online data code: nrg_105a
Age of EU NPPs in 2012
Source: European Commission
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There are two types of operating reactors in the EU. Utilities use either Western- or
Russian-designed reactors. Both have a distinct nuclear fuel procurement approach.
Utilities using Western reactors enter into separate contracts for procurement,
which allow diversification of all steps of the front end of the fuel cycle (from
uranium mining companies to fuel assembly manufacturers, via conversion and
enrichment service providers). Utilities operating Russian reactors usually purchase
their fuel as integrated packages of fuel assemblies from the same supplier, the
Russian company TVEL. In this approach, there is no diversification, nor back-up in
case of supply problems (whether for technical or political reasons).
In 2013, Kazakhstan (21.2%) and Canada (18.5%) were the largest suppliers of natural
uranium to EU utilities. Russia came in third with 18.1%. In recent years, Kazakhstan
has become by far the world’s largest producer of natural uranium and is the equiv-
alent of Saudi Arabia in oil production.
In 2013, 60% of the EU requirements for enrichment services were supplied by EU
industry, 36% by Russia and 3% by US industry. However, capacities operated by EU
industry (AREVA and Urenco) would be sufficient to cover all EU needs for enrich-
ment services if no imports were available. Roughly 20% of EU nuclear power plant
requirements for natural uranium and 36% of the requirements for uranium enrich-
ment services are currently covered by supplies from Russia. Two of Finland’s four
reactors are Russian designed and supplied, while Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Slovakia are 100% dependent on Russian nuclear fuels. In addition,
many western EU utilities also have substantial supplies of enriched uranium from
Russia (between 20% and 40% of their needs). The EU’s high dependence on uranium
imports is somewhat risky because of the political uncertainty concerning uranium
coming from countries like Russia, Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan, and also from some
African countries. Nonetheless, a real shortage appears unlikely in the medium term,
while other countries like Canada, Australia or Namibia could increase their produc-
tion in response. Russia’s potential for uranium enrichment services covers approxi-
mately half the world’s capacity and over twice the EU’s annual requirements. There-
fore, the risk exists that over-abundant imports from Russia could jeopardize the
viability of the EU’s own enrichment industry.8
Finally, it must be emphasized that the EU strategy in favour of renewable electricity
represents a new challenge for the nuclear sector, both for general and specific
reasons. From a general point of view, the classical system of base-load electricity
production is strongly challenged by the penetration of renewable electricity in many
national markets. All producers of electricity using fossil fuels had to adapt during the
last decade and get used to producing power intermittently, sometimes at very low
8 See SWD In-depth study of European energy security – SWD(2014) 330 final/3 – 2.7.2014 – p. 73-79.
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prices, and sometimes even at negative prices. In this context, nuclear power plants
are strongly quite inflexible, not only due to price, but also to safety:
“Load-following operation is subject to significant technical restrictions. Flexible
operation is excluded during the last phase of the fuel load cycle, usually 60 days out
of 12-16 months, and load-following should not be carried out with damaged fuel in
the core. A delicate core component of the reactor, the control rod drive mechanism,
needs to be adapted, and requires increased maintenance and more frequent
replacement. Increased inspection and maintenance is needed also for other compo-
nents. The volume of liquid radioactive waste increases, in average by 2500m³/unit/
year. Turbine efficiency decreases and the risk for disturbance in operations could
increase. Also, ‘the risk for disturbance in operations could increase … [R]egarding
the manoeuvrability of PWRs, load variation operation could reduce safety margins
of accidental transients, in comparison to base load operation.’9
9 M. Schneider and A. Froggatt, The world nuclear industry status report 2014, SES/H. Boll Foundation, 2014,
p. 88 (see the various studies quoted).
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2. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. The Treaty
2.1.1. The particularities of Euratom in the Treaty framework
Civil nuclear energy is covered by a specific European treaty, the Euratom Treaty,
which established the EAEC. In the 1950s, nuclear energy generated extravagant
hopes of unlimited electricity, and was seen as the energy source of the future.
However, after the Treaty’s conclusion, the development of Euratom’s activities was
brought to a halt by the proximity of civil to defense aspects. For decades, little
happened. It was the Chernobyl disaster that provoked a renewal of interest in these
activities.10 More legislative texts were adopted.11 Euratom acceded to various inter-
national conventions. It concluded bilateral agreements. It also began to offer finan-
cial and technical support to third states, especially neighbouring ones.
During the long negotiation of the Lisbon Treaty from 2002 onwards, it remained
impossible to integrate EAEC activities into the EU Treaty’s general framework. Some
Member States remained hostile to nuclear energy. Others were favourable, but did
not intend to apply the Community method to this sensitive area of activity. In fact,
any revision of the Euratom Treaty raised strong doubts.12 Consequently, these activ-
ities remain covered by a specific treaty.13
This, of course, can occasionally generate problems linked to the difficulty of defining
the precise border between the general EU framework and the specific Euratom
one.14 More generally, the relationship between the EU and Euratom has become
more ambiguous since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In the past, Euratom
was one of the communities upon which the EU was founded (Article 3, old Treaty of
the European Union or TEU). The EC Treaty could not derogate from the Euratom
Treaty (Article 305 § 2, old TEC).15 These general references have now disappeared.
The TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) do not refer to the
Euratom Treaty. Paradoxically, at the same time, the institutional particularities of
10 See J. C. Pirotte, 30 ans d’expérience Euratom, Bruylant, 1998, chap. 5.
11 For a good description, see CEC, Fifty years of the EURATOM Treaty, COM (2007) 124.
12 See D. Fouquet, The Legal Perspective: The Euratom Treaty and the new Constitution, Energy intelligence for
Europe, 2005; N. Prieto Serrano, ‘Wakening the serpent: reflection on the possible modification of the
Euratom Treaty’, 1 International Nuclear Law 11 (2006).
13 See P. Barnes, ‘The resurrection of the Euratom Treaty’, Yearbook of European Environmental Law, 2008,
pp. 182-217.
14 See R. Ptasekaite, The Euratom Treaty v. Treaties of the European Union: limits of competence and interac-
tion, Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, 2012.
15 See T. Cusack, ‘A tale of two treaties: an assessment of the Euratom Treaty in relation with the EC Treaty’,
40 Common Market Law Review 117 (2003).
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the Euratom Treaty have been strongly reduced through many direct references to
the TEU and TFEU Treaties.16
In a vital domain, however, the subsidies granted by Member States to the electricity
sector may be assessed according to the present TFEU rather than the EAEC Treaty.
This was, for example, the basis of the General Court’s (then the Court of First
Instance) 2006 judgment regarding a German tax exemption scheme applied to
nuclear power plants.17 In 2013, this topic came back into the spotlight when the
Commission opened a formal inquiry regarding the UK subsidies offered to support
the new Hinkley Point nuclear power plant.18
2.1.2. The specific meaning of Articles 30 to 32, Euratom
The legal basis of the nuclear safety competence of Euratom is set in Articles 30 to 32
of the consolidated version of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community19 (the Euratom Treaty).
According to Article 30:
… basic Standards shall be laid down within the Community for the protection
of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising
from ionizing radiations. The expression ‘basic standards’ means: (a)
maximum permissible doses compatible with adequate safety; (b) maximum
permissible levels of exposure and contamination; (c) the fundamental princi-
ples governing the health surveillance of workers.
According to Article 31:
… the basic standards shall be worked out by the Commission after it has
obtained the opinion of a group of persons appointed by the Scientific and
Technical Committee from among scientific experts, and in particular public
health experts, in the Member States. The Commission shall obtain the
opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on these basic standards. After
consulting the European Parliament the Council shall, on a proposal from the
Commission, which shall forward to it the opinions obtained from these
Committees, establish the basic standards; the Council shall act by a qualified
majority.
16 A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout and S. Ripley, EU Law after Lisbon, pp. 58-60.
17 Case T-92/02, Stadtwerke Schwäbisch Hall GmbH, Stadtwerke Tübingen GmbH and Stadtwerke Uelzen
GmbH v Commission of the European Communities, ECR 2006, II, 11.
18 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/251157/251157_1507977_35_2.pdf (accessed 30
October 2014).
On this aspect of the project, see also S. Thomas and D. Fouquet, The new UK nuclear power programme –
a FIT for nuclear and a blueprint for illegal state aid?, Greens/EFA EP Group, 2013.
19 OJ EU C 327, 26. 10. 2012, 1-107.
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According to Article 32, finally:
… at the request of the Commission or of a Member State, the basic standards
may be revised or supplemented in accordance with the procedure laid down
in Article 31. The Commission shall examine any request made by a Member
State.
First of all, it is essential to distinguish nuclear safety from nuclear security. Simply
put, nuclear safety concerns the protection of people from power plants, and nuclear
security the protection of power plants from people. Thanks to Articles 30 to 32,
nuclear safety constitutes a competence of the Euratom, but nuclear security does
not. It could, however, be dealt with in the framework of the fight against terrorism,
through the framework of police and justice cooperation. As indicated by the Euro-
pean Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG), “Nuclear power plants use fissile
materials to produce energy in the form of heat, which is converted to electricity by
conventional generating plant. Radioactive materials are produced as a by-product
of this process. Whilst radioactive materials can have beneficial uses, such as in
cancer therapy, they are generally harmful to health. Their use, and the process by
which they are produced, must be strictly regulated to ensure nuclear safety. The
scope of nuclear safety and its regulation covers the whole ‘nuclear fuel cycle’. The
nuclear fuel cycle includes the extraction and enrichment of radioactive ores, the
production of nuclear fuels, the transport and use of fuel in the operation of nuclear
power plants, the reprocessing of spent fuel to recover reusable materials for more
fuel, and the storage of nuclear waste. Apart from the management of fuel, nuclear
safety particularly covers the design, construction, operation and decommissioning
of all nuclear installations such as nuclear power plants and waste storage facilities.
Ensuring nuclear safety also requires the availability of suitably qualified staff, the
establishment of an effective safety culture in the workforce, the funding of research
into operational and safety issues and an appropriate focus on security. The work of
nuclear regulators covers all these aspects.”20
The Euratom competence on nuclear safety has been recognized by an essential
judgment of the European Court of Justice. Case C-29/9921 concerned the approba-
tion by the Council, in accordance with Article 101 of the Euratom Treaty, of the
accession to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS).22 In this framework, the
Council was required to communicate to the depositary a full declaration of the EC
competences, which was the object of the conflict.
According to the Court, “it is not appropriate, in order to define the Community’s
competencies, to draw an artificial distinction between the protection of the health
20 http://www.ensreg.eu/nuclear-safety
21 See Case C-29/99. Judgement of the Court of 10 December 2002
22 See IAEA document INFCIRC/449 – Convention on Nuclear Safety – 5 July 1994.
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of the general public and the safety of sources of ionising radiation.” “Even though
the Euratom Treaty does not grant the Community competence to authorise the
construction or operation of nuclear installations, under Articles 30 to 32 of the
Euratom Treaty the Community possesses legislative competence to establish, for
the purpose of health protection, an authorisation system which must be applied by
the Member States. Such a legislative act constitutes a measure supplementing the
basic standards referred to in that article.”
The Court analysed whether the fields covered by the CNS were also covered – at
least in part – by the Euratom competences. It then found that Euratom possesses
competences in the fields relating to (a) the establishment of a legislative and regula-
tory framework to govern the safety of nuclear installations; (b) measures relating to
the assessment and verification of safety; (c) emergency preparedness; (d) the siting
of a nuclear installation; (e) the design, construction and operation of nuclear instal-
lations. Those should have been mentioned in the declaration attached to the
Council decision approving the EAEC’s accession to the CNS.
The existence of this Euratom competence is important, as indicated by another
judgment of the European Court of Justice, concerning the Czech power plant at
Temelin.23 In this context, there was a conflict between Austrian courts over the
issue of whether a nationality condition could be used to determine the admissibility
of a legal action. The Court had to deal with the impact of the absence of any prohi-
bition of nationality discrimination in the Euratom Treaty. It considered that “Article
12 EC, which prohibits any discrimination on grounds of nationality, is a specific
expression of the general principle of equality, which itself is one of the fundamental
principles of Community law. In the light of the foregoing, it would appear to be
contrary to both the purpose and the consistency of the treaties to allow discrimina-
tion on grounds of nationality, which is prohibited under the EC Treaty by virtue of
Article 12 EC, to be tolerated within the scope of application of the EAEC Treaty.” The
existence of the Euratom competence concerning the safety of nuclear power plants
was invoked in this context to explain the lack of justification for national
measures.24
23 Case C-115/08, Oberösterreich v. EZ as, 2009 E.C.R. I – 10265.
24 ‘In those circumstances, the Court finds that, if a Member State has enacted a domestic provision which,
like Paragraph 364a of the ABGB, as interpreted by the national court, prevents an action for an injunction
to prevent an actual or potential nuisance from being brought when the alleged nuisance originates from
an officially authorised industrial installation, that Member State cannot, in principle, exclude from the
scope of application of such a provision authorisations granted in respect of nuclear installations situated in
other Member States by maintaining that such an exclusion is justified on grounds of protecting life, public
health, the environment or property rights.
Such an exclusion disregards completely the fact that the Community legislative framework, as described in
paragraphs 111 to 134 of this judgment and of which such authorisations form a part, contributes precisely
and essentially towards ensuring such protection. That exclusion cannot be regarded as necessary for the
purposes of protection and therefore cannot be held to satisfy the requirement of proportionality, either.’
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2.2. The Nuclear Safety Directive 2009/71/Euratom
2.2.1. The basis of the 1994 IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety
The fundamental text in the field of nuclear safety remains the IAEA Convention on
Nuclear Safety (CNS), signed in 1994 and entered into force into 1996. It aims ‘to
protect individuals, society and the environment from harm by establishing and
maintaining in nuclear installations effective defences against radiological
hazards.’25 The adoption of this treaty was a direct result of the Chernobyl
catastrophe. However, even that did not provoke the adoption of mandatory provi-
sions for safety controls. Instead an ‘incentive-oriented’ approach was preferred. It
was considered at the time that “enlightened self-interest of states in matters of
nuclear safety would be stronger than any form of outside control devised under
international law; this self-interest would be developed and promoted among the
contracting parties with nuclear installations, that is the ‘peer group’; peer group
‘pressure’ or ‘persuasion’ would be effective in compelling the parties to meet their
obligations under the convention and as a result improve nuclear safety in all power
plants”26.
It is very important to remember that description, coming from the secretary of the
group of experts in charge of the Convention drafting. Firstly, the drama of Fukus-
hima exposed the limits of this philosophy. Secondly, the notion of ‘peer group’
remains also, as will be seen, at the centre of the EU regime. This deserves special
attention, since it is a quite unusual method for the framework of the EU. The
Convention also foresees the organization of review conferences (Article 20, CNS)
with the simple purpose of ‘reviewing the reports.’27 There have been six triennial
conferences, from 1999 onwards, and they have produced many documents, begin-
ning with guidelines concerning the review process and the national reports.28 Inter-
estingly, the weakness of the CNS control mechanisms has often been debated.29
The adhesion of regional organizations was foreseen by the CNS in its Article 30 (4).
The EAEC thus acceded to the Convention after Decision 1999/819 of the Commis-
sion on the basis of Article 101 of the Euratom Treaty, following a Decision of the
Council of 7 December 1998.30 It has since participated in the Review meetings of the
contracting parties. This participation remains, however, limited to Euratom’s fields
25 O. Jankowitsch-Prevor, ‘The Convention on Nuclear Safety’, in International nuclear law in the post-Cher-
nobyl period, 2006, p. 159.
26 Ibid.
27 See C. Stoiber, ‘The review conference mechanism in nuclear law: issues and opportunities’, Nuclear Law
Bulletin 2009/1.
28 See, for example, the Commission’s report for the 6th Review meeting of the Contracting Parties to the
Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) Vienna, 24 March to 4 April 2014.
29 See O. Jankowitsch, ‘The Convention on Nuclear Safety’, Nuclear Law Bulletin, 1994/2.
30 Commission Decision 1999/819/Euratom of 16 November 1999 concerning the accession to the 1994
Convention on Nuclear Safety by the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), OJ L 318, 11.12.1999,
p. 20.
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of competence. The Convention has also been ratified by all the 28 EU Member
States, who are now contracting parties.
The CNS is only the keystone of a complex international system. The new interna-
tional safety regime … known as the ‘Family of Nuclear Safety Conventions’ consists
of the 1986 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and its twin, the
1986 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency, the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), the 1997 Joint Convention
on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management (JC), the 1980 Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
(1980 CPPNM)124 and the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protec-
tion of Nuclear Material (2005 CPPNM). The creation of this ‘family’ marks an impor-
tant step in the path toward internationalizing nuclear safety requirements.31
After Fukushima, the contracting parties of the IAEA immediately launched an
assessment of the events. As indicated by their conclusion at the Second Extraordi-
nary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in 2012,
‘We must ensure that operators, who have the primary responsibility for safe opera-
tion of nuclear power plants, make needed safety improvements to address and
draw the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident.’
2.2.2. Directive 2009/71/ Euratom
In 2003, the Commission adopted two proposals for Council (Euratom) Directives.
The first set out basic obligations and general principles on the safety of nuclear
installations, and the second covered the management of spent nuclear fuel and
radioactive waste.32 One essential component was the establishment of common
safety standards for existing installations, and a Community body of safety inspectors
to control the standards’ implementation.
After numerous consultations with the legislative institutions and international
organizations (the IAEA and the Nuclear Energy Agency or NEA), it became clear that
the national authorities and industries were concerned with these proposals.33 They
were thus amended for the first time in 2004.34 The debate remained, however,
31 N. Pelzer, ‘Safer nuclear energy through a higher degree of internationalisation? International involvement
versus national sovereignty’, Nuclear Law Bulletin, 2013/1, p. 65. This report provides an excellent analysis
of the concept of nuclear safety at the international level.
32 See proposal for a Council (Euratom) Directive Setting out basic obligations and general principles on the
safety of nuclear installations and proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) on the management of spent
nuclear fuel and radioactive waste – COM(2003) 32 final – 2003/0021(CNS) – 2003/0022 (CNS) – 30.1.2003
33 On the history of this tough legislative procedure, see the excellent comment of Y. Pouleur and P. Krs, ‘The
momentum of the European Directive on Nuclear Safety’, Nuclear Law Bulletin, 2010/1, pp. 5-33.
34 See Amended proposal for a Council (Euratom) Directive Setting out basic obligations and general principles
on the safety of nuclear installations and Amended proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) on the
management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste – COM(2004) 526 final – 2003/0021(CNS) – 2003/
0022 (CNS) – 8.9.2004
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tense, and these revised proposals met various resistances. Consequently, in 2008,
the Commission adopted a new proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) setting up
a Community framework for nuclear safety.35 This proposal was accompanied by an
impact assessment.36 This new text aimed to re-start the process of establishing a
common EU framework on nuclear safety, and thus replaced the 2003 proposal.37
In 2009, the Council unanimously adopted Directive 2009/71/Euratom, establishing
a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations38 (Nuclear
Safety Directive). The Nuclear Safety Directive creates a flexible, legally binding
framework that defines basic principles and obligations governing nuclear safety. In
fact, it chiefly reflects the provisions of the main international instruments on
nuclear safety: the Convention on Nuclear Safety of 5 July 1994 and the Safety Funda-
mentals established by the IAEA.39 The structure of the Directive is even based on the
structure of the Convention. This was meant to distinguish clearly between the
objectives and the obligations of the Member States. This, however, has not been
fully achieved since there is an ‘essential overlap between the scope of application,
the definitions and the operational articles.’40
Pursuant to Article 1, the Directive defines nuclear safety as the achievement of
proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents and mitigation of accident
consequences, resulting in protection of workers and the general public from
dangers arising from ionizing radiations from nuclear installations. The objectives of
the Nuclear Safety Directive are to maintain and promote the improvement of
nuclear safety and to ensure that EU Member States provide national arrangements
for a high level of nuclear safety, providing protection against dangers arising from
nuclear installations.
Article 2 sets the scope of the Directive. This Directive applies to any civilian nuclear
installation operating under a licence, and at all stages of this licence. The Directive
does not prevent Member States from taking more stringent safety measures. It
supplements the basic standards set by Article 30 of the Treaty regarding the nuclear
safety of nuclear installations. Several obligations for the Member States are set in
the Directive.
35 See new proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) setting up a Community framework for nuclear safety –
COM(2008) 790.
36 See SWD accompanying the document to the Proposal for a Council Directive (Euratom) setting up a
Community framework for nuclear safety – SEC(2008) 2892 – 26.11.2008.
37 The comparison of the first proposal and the Directive 2009/71/Euratom has been made by M. SousaFerro,
‘Directive 2009/71/Euratom: the losing battle against discrimination and protection of sovereignty’, Inter-
national Journal of Nuclear Law, 2009, Vol. 2, No. 4.
38 OJ EU L 172, 2. 7. 2009, pp. 18-22.
39 See IAEA Safety Standards for protecting people and the environment – Fundamental Safety Principles –
Safety Fundamentals No. SF-1 – 2006.
40 Y. Pouleur and P. Krs, ‘The momentum of the European Directive on Nuclear Safety’, Nuclear Law Bulletin,
2010/1, p. 15.
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Pursuant to Article 4, Member States shall establish and maintain a national legisla-
tive, regulatory and organizational framework (hereinafter ‘national framework’) for
nuclear safety establishing the adoption of national nuclear safety requirements, the
provision of a system of licensing and prohibiting operation of nuclear installations
without a licence. The national framework also sets responsibilities for the provision
of a system of nuclear safety supervision, enforcement actions including suspension
of operation and modification or revocation of a licence. Member States must
guarantee that the national framework is maintained and improved when appro-
priate.
If standards must be applied, the Directive’s authors seemed to believe that they
would come from elsewhere. It is useful to build on the process where the national
safety authorities of the Member States with nuclear power plants on their territory
have been working together in the context of Western European Nuclear Regulators’
Association (WENRA), and have defined many safety reference levels for power
reactors. (Recital 14).
Article 5 sets the competences of the regulatory authority: Member States shall
establish and maintain a competent regulatory authority in the field of nuclear safety
of nuclear installations. The competent regulatory authority must work separately
from any other body or organization in the field of nuclear energy, including
electricity production, and must have effective independence from undue influence
in its regulatory decision making. Furthermore, Member States shall ensure that the
competent regulatory authority is given the legal powers and human and financial
resources necessary to fulfil its obligations in connection with the national frame-
work with due priority to safety.
Pursuant to Article 6, Member States must ensure that the prime responsibility for
nuclear safety of nuclear installations rests with the licence holder, and that this
responsibility cannot be delegated. Licence holders, under the supervision of the
competent regulatory authority, must regularly assess, verify and continuously
improve as far as possible the safety of their nuclear installation, including ensuring
that measures are in place for the prevention and mitigation of consequences of
accidents. The National framework must require licence holders to establish and
implement management systems giving due priority to nuclear safety, which are
regularly verified by the competent regulatory authority.
According to Article 7, Member States must guarantee that the national framework
requires arrangements for education and training for all parties of their staff who
have responsibilities relating to the nuclear safety of nuclear installations. Pursuant
to Article 8, Member States must ensure that information in relation to the regula-
tion of nuclear safety is made available for the workers and the general public. This
information shall be made available to the public in accordance with national legisla-
tion and international obligations.
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Finally, according to Article 9, Member States shall submit a report to the Commis-
sion on the implementation of the Directive for the first time by 22 July 2014, and
every three years thereafter. With the aim of continuously improving nuclear safety,
Member States shall arrange for periodic self-assessments of their national frame-
work and competent regulatory authorities at least every ten years, and invite an
international peer review of the relevant segments of their national framework and/
or authorities. The self-assessment and peer review thus replaced the supranational
monitoring in the original 2003 proposal. It is important to realize that self assesse-
ments and peer review were not meant to constitute – at least in the view of the
text’s authors – a real inforcement system: The self-assessments followed by inter-
national peer reviews are neither an inspection nor an audit, but a mutual learning
mechanism that accepts different approaches to the organisation and practices of a
competent regulatory authority, while considering regulatory, technical and policy
issues of a Member State that contribute to ensuring a strong nuclear safety regime.
The international peer reviews should be regarded as an opportunity to exchange
professional experience and to share lessons learned and good practices in an open
and cooperative spirit through advice by peers rather than control or judgment
(Recital 21).41
2.3. The nuclear combustible Directive 2011/70/EURATOM
Following the adoption of the Nuclear Safety Directive, the Commission made a
proposal for a Council Directive on the management of spent fuel and radioactive
waste.42 This proposed Directive revised the 2003 Commission proposal for a Council
(Euratom) Directive on the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.43 After
some amendments, the Council adopted Directive 2011/70/EURATOM of 19 July
2011, establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe manage-
ment of spent fuel and radioactive waste.44
2.4. The Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (INSC)
In 2007, the Council adopted Regulation (Euratom) 300/2007 establishing an Instru-
ment for Nuclear Safety Cooperation.45 This Regulation establishes a framework for
funding measures to provide a high level of nuclear safety and radiological protec-
tion, as well as the implementation of safety controls in Non-EU Member States. This
41 Some authors have rather made a parallel with the open method of coordination, which is nonetheless a
quite different process. See A. Sodersten, ‘The EU and nuclear safety: challenges old and new’, SIEPS, 2012/
10, p. 8.
42 See proposal for a Council Directive on the management of spent fuel and radioactive waste – COM(2010)
618 final – 2010/0306 (NLE) – 3.11.2010.
43 See COM(2003) 32 final and COM(2004) 526 final.
44 OJ EU L 199, 2.8.2011, pp. 48-56
45 OJ EU L 81, 22.3.2007, pp. 1-10.
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framework covers the period from 1 January 2007 to 31 December 2013. For that
period, a sum of €524 million is involved. The Regulation provides financial support
for measures that, for instance, improve nuclear safety, accident prevention and
reaction in case of an accident, and also the promotion of international cooperation.
In 2011, the Commission published a proposal for a Council Regulation establishing
an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation.46 The legislative procedure is the
Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation 2014-2020.47 A Council Regulation estab-
lishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation was published in the Official
Journal of the EU of 31 July 2012.48 A Report of the European Parliament concerning
this proposal was presented during the European Parliament’s plenary sitting of 16
October 2012.49
In 2012, the Commission published a Report on the Implementation of the Instru-
ment for Nuclear Safety Cooperation.50 This Report was accompanied by the
Commission Staff Working Document the Report from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of the Instrument for
Nuclear Safety Cooperation – Second Report – Action Programmes for 2010 and
2011.51
2.5. The nuclear research programmes
Since 1994, Euratom has established the ability to implement Framework
Programmes for nuclear research and training activities that are different to but run
parallel with the Framework Programmes for Research and Development under the
EC Treaty. Euratom research is currently supported by the 7th Euratom Research
Framework Programme (FP7), which covers the period 2007-2011.
The Council Decision 2012/93/Euratom concerning the Framework Programme of
the European Atomic Energy Community for nuclear research and training activities
(2012 to 2013)52 extends the budget of the 2007-2001 Euratom Framework
46 See proposal for a Council Regulation establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation –
COM(2011) 841 final – 7.12.2011.
47 See 2011/0414(CNS)
48 OJ EU C 229, 31.7.2012, pp. 103-107.
49 See European Parliament Report on the proposal for a Council Regulation establishing an Instrument for
Nuclear Safety Cooperation – A7-0327/2012 – 15.10.2012.
50 See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of the Instrument for Nuclear
Safety Cooperation – Second Report – Action Programmes for 2010 and 2011 – 18.12.2012 – COM (2012)
771 final.
51 SWD accompanying the document Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the implementation of
the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation – Second Report – Action Programmes for 2010 and 2011 –
18.12.2012 – SWD(2012) 436 final.
52 OJ EU L 47, 18. 2. 2013, pp. 25-32.
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Programme, which funds nuclear research, to cover the years 2012 and 2013. About
€2.5 billion are available for the period from 2012 to 2013 for research projects in
fission and radiation protection, as well as the fusion and nuclear activities of the
Joint Research Centre (JRC). The Framework Programme covers two specific
programmes. One covers indirect actions such as fusion energy research and nuclear
fission, safety and radiation protection. The second covers direct research activities
of the Joint Research Centre (JRC).53
Regarding the first specific programme covering indirect actions, more than €2.2
billion will be allocated to fusion energy research by developing the knowledge base
for, and realizing the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) as a
major step towards the creation of prototype reactors for power stations that are
safe, sustainable, environmentally responsible, and economically viable. The
construction of ITER is the first priority of the strategy to achieve this long-term goal.
ITER is being built in Cadarache, in the South of France. ITER aims to prove the feasi-
bility of fusion power through a full exploration of the relevant science and by
allowing the testing of key technology components for future fusion power plants.
ITER is the biggest energy research project in the world, and an example of interna-
tional scientific collaboration. The parties developing ITER are China, the EU, India,
Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States. The agreement for the Joint Imple-
mentation of the ITER Project54 was signed in 2006 in Paris.
Regarding the second specific programme covering direct actions, about €230
million were devoted to the nuclear activities of the JRC, with a high priority given to
supporting the implementation of the EU Nuclear Power Plants ‘stress test’ peer
reviews. Research on nuclear power plant decommissioning was also included in the
JRC nuclear activities.55
In 2013, the Commission presented a Report to the Council Specific Monitoring
Report on research activities for nuclear safety and security supported by the
Euratom Framework Programme 2012-2013.56 This report was accompanied by a
staff working document.57 Euratom funding corresponds approximately to 9% of the
public and private research and development spending in the EU in this field, with
47% spent by public bodies within the different Member States and 44% funded by
industry.
53 Joint Nuclear Research Centre established pursuant Article 8, paragraph 1, of the Euratom Treaty.
54 OJ EU L 358, 16. 12.2006, pp. 62-81
55 See Council Decision 2012/93/Euratom – OJ EU L 47, 18.2.2012, pp. 25-32
56 See Report from the Commission to the Council – Specific Monitoring Report on research activities for
nuclear safety and security supported by the Euratom Framework Programme 2012-2013. COM(2013) 308
final – 27.5.2013.
57 See SWD accompanying the Report from the Commission to the Council – Specific Monitoring Report on
research activities for nuclear safety and security supported by the Euratom Framework Programme 2012-
2013.
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3. THE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN
UNION AND THE IAEA
Euratom and the IAEA have developed extensive scientific and technological cooper-
ation over many years. The partnership started in 1973 with the signature of the
agreement between the IAEA and Euratom in connection with the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.58 In practice and pursuant to Article 17, paragraph
1 of the TEU, the Commission represents the EU and in this case the Euratom
Community on international forums and negotiates bilateral agreements with inter-
national organizations or third countries.
In recent years, the cooperation between the IAEA and the EU has grown signifi-
cantly. The EU and its Member States are major contributors to the activities of the
IAEA. The EU cooperates with the IAEA using its financial instruments. The partner-
ship is also based on technical expertise (e.g., the Instrument for Nuclear Safety
Cooperation59). The cooperation used to be based on non-proliferation and
ensuring that all nuclear material is used only for peaceful purposes, but since the
Fukushima accident, nuclear safety and nuclear security have a more significant
role.
In September 2013, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for a partnership
between Euratom and the IAEA on nuclear safety cooperation was signed in Vienna60
to reinforce the nuclear safety cooperation and to make it more structured. This
MoU is based on the 1976 Cooperation Agreement,61 and the 2008 ‘Joint State-
ment.’62 It creates an enhanced framework for planning various forms of coopera-
tion in the field of nuclear safety. Both organizations will benefit from each other’s
experience, avoid duplication of effort and contribute to increasing nuclear safety in
the world as a whole. This cooperation does not mean that the Commission has a
decision-making power in IAEA decisions. As set in the rules of procedure of the
General Conference63 of the IAEA, and pursuant to rule 32: ‘Representatives of inter-
national organizations, other than the United Nations and the specialized agencies …
shall be entitled … to attend sessions of the General Conference and to participate
58 See text of the agreement of 14 September 1973 – IAEA doc INFCIRC/193.
59 The Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation was established by Council Regulation (Euratom) 300/2007
of 19 February 2007 – OJ EU L 81, 22.3.2007, pp. 1-10 – and covered the period between 2007 and 2013
60 See text of the Memorandum of Understanding – http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/safety/doc/
20130917_ec_iaea_mou_nuclear.pdf.
61 OJ EC L 329, 23. 12. 1975, pp. 28-29.
62 See http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/pdf/iaea_euratom070508.pdf.
63 The General Conference is the highest policymaking body of the IAEA. It is composed of representatives of
all the states in the agency. The General Conference meets annually to consider and approve the Agency’s
programme and budget and to decide on other matters brought before it by the Board of Governors, the
Director General, or member states.
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without vote on matters of common interest between them and the Agency.’ The EU
itself has no formal observer status at the IAEA, while the Euratom Community is an
observer.
25
4. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S REACTION AFTER
FUKUSHIMA
A few days after the Fukushima accident, a European response was launched.64 The
European Council, in its conclusion of 24-25 March 2011, declared that:
the safety of all EU nuclear plants should be reviewed, on the basis of a
comprehensive and transparent risk assessment (‘stress tests’); the European
Nuclear Safety Regulatory Group (ENSREG65) and the Commission are invited
to develop as soon as possible the scope and modalities of these tests in a
coordinated framework in the light of the lessons learned from the accident
in Japan and with the full involvement of Member States, making full use of
available expertise (notably from the Western European Nuclear Regulators
Association (WENRA)66; the assessments will be conducted by independent
national authorities and through peer review; their outcome and any neces-
sary subsequent measures that will be taken should be shared with the
Commission and should be made public; the European Council will assess
initial findings by the end of 2011, on the basis of a report from the Commis-
sion.67
4.1. The process of the stress tests
During their March 2011 plenary meeting, WENRA members decided to agree on an
independent regulatory technical definition of a ‘stress test’, and how it should be
applied to nuclear facilities across Europe. In May 2011, the European Commission
and ENSREG agreed on voluntary tests for the 143 nuclear power reactors in the EU.
The stress tests started 1 June 2011. On 23 June 2011, the Commission, the Republic
of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Croatia, the Russian Federation,
the Swiss Confederation, the Republic of Turkey and Ukraine agreed on a joint decla-
ration on comprehensive risk and safety assessments of nuclear plants (stress tests).
The Ad Hoc Group on Nuclear Security (AHGNS) was created on 21 July 2011 on the
basis of a Coreper decision and a mandate.68 The AHGNS aims to identify and share
64 For a good synthesis of the situation in Fukushima three years on, see M. Schneider and A. Froggatt, The
world nuclear industry status report 2014, SES/H. Boll Foundation, 2014, pp. 59-72.
65 ENSREG Commission Decision 2007/530/Euratom of 10 July 2007 on establishing the European High Level
Group on Nuclear Safety and Waste Management. OJ EU L 195, 27.7.2007, pp. 44-46
66 WENRA is an association of the heads of nuclear regulatory authorities for EU countries with nuclear power
plants and Switzerland.
67 See European Council document EUCO 10/1/11 REV 1 – Conclusions of the European Council (24/25 March
2011) – 20.4.2011.
68 Council document No 13111/11 + ADD 1. See also, Council Document 10616/12, 31.05.2012 – Final report
of the AHGNS as agreed on 24 May – p. 4.
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good practices and consider possible ways to improve general security principles
based on the nuclear security recommendations of the IAEA.
In November 2011, the Commission adopted a Communication on the interim report
on the stress tests for nuclear power plants in the EU.69 This communication was
accompanied by a Commission Staff Working Paper, Technical Summary of the
national progress reports on the implementation of comprehensive risk and safety
assessments of the EU nuclear power plants.70
During the next three months, the Commission organized a Public Consultation
seeking the views of stakeholders and other interested parties on the need for
additional nuclear safety legislative measures at Euratom level. As a result of this
Public Consultation, more than 90% of respondents agreed on the importance of a
Euratom nuclear safety framework, setting up common rules for EU Member States,
while more than 75% agreed on the need to reinforce the existing safety legislative
framework.
In April 2012, the ENSREG stress-test report based on a peer review was adopted.71
The ENSREG overall report highlights four main areas for improvement, to be
explored across Europe: (1) Issuing WENRA guidance with the contribution of the
best available expertise from Europe on assessment of natural hazards, including
earthquake, flooding and extreme weather conditions, and margins taking account
of the existing IAEA guidelines; (2) Underlining the importance of periodic safety
review; (3) Urgently implementing the recognized measures to protect containment
integrity, and (4) Minimizing accidents resulting from natural hazards and limiting
their consequences.
The conclusions of the report are not easy to assess. Firstly, the designs of the
nuclear power plants (NPPs) are very different from one country to another. Conse-
quently, the evaluation of the global safety level is difficult. Making recommenda-
tions is still more difficult. As the report rightly underlines, plant designers and opera-
tors had multiple choices and have chosen the solutions that are often specific to the
design or specific site. Therefore different safety features are available to cope with
similar scenarios. The strong safety features for one plant would not therefore neces-
sarily be a similarly ‘strong’ safety feature when transferred to another plant. The
selection of features is ultimately specific to the plant/design and site and the advan-
tages and drawbacks have to be carefully considered before any transfer.72
69 See communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the interim
report on the comprehensive risk and safety assessments (‘stress tests’) of nuclear power plants in the EU,
– COM(2011) 784 final – 24.11.2011.
70 See Commission Staff Working Paper – Technical Summary of the national progress reports on the imple-
mentation of comprehensive risk and safety assessments of the EU nuclear power plants – SEC(2011)
1395 final – 24.11.2011
71 http://www.ensreg.eu/sites/default/files/EU%20Stress%20Test%20Peer%20Review%20Final%20Report_
0.pdf (accessed 29 June 2013).
72 Ibid., p. 28.
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Secondly, this is a peer review, meaning each national regulator is dependent on the
others’ appreciation and knows it very well. Some sentences are thus a perfect illus-
tration of bureaucratic carefulness. For example, ‘The review process determined
that in most cases the design is robust, with strong safety features,’73 (authors’
emphasis). The conclusion is, from this point of view, a work of art:
With regard to the external hazards topic, overall the design basis events
were well addressed in country reports. Most countries have demonstrated
an adequate approach to seismic and flooding design bases, although there
were significant differences in national approaches. However, the assessment
of margins beyond design basis has been quite diverse, and very few coun-
tries assessed cliff-edges in the manner requested by ENSREG. This is possibly
because of the short timeframe and the lack of a consistently recognised
method in this area. Many regulators also indicated that work in this respect
is either ongoing or planned in the near future. The situation is even less satis-
factory with regard to extreme weather, and especially for combinations of
extreme weather phenomena.74 (emphasis added).
The consecutive report from the Commission also provokes unease. Commenting on
the findings concerning safety, the Commission first emphasizes that:
based on the stress tests, national regulators concluded that there are no
technical reasons requiring the shutdown of any NPP in Europe, and identified
a series of good practices. The Commission is not empowered to make assess-
ments of this nature. However, practically all NPPs need to undergo safety
improvements, as hundreds of technical upgrade measures have been identi-
fied.
It then mentions a striking inertia: ‘following the accidents at Three Mile Island and
Chernobyl, measures to protect nuclear plants were globally agreed. The stress tests
demonstrated however that in many instances the implementation of those meas-
ures is still pending.’75
After that, the Commission provides some concrete findings in a less reassuring style
than ENSREG:
In 4 reactors (located in two different countries), there is less than 1 hour
available to operators to restore the safety functions in case of loss of all elec-
trical power and/or ultimate heat sink. In 10 reactors, on-site seismic instru-
mentation is not installed yet. 4 countries currently operate additional safety
systems fully independent from the normal safety systems, located in areas
73 Ibid., p. 33.
74 Ibid., p. 45.
75 See COM (2012) 571 final, p. 6.
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well protected against external events (e.g., bunkered systems or hardened
core of safety systems). A fifth country is considering this option. Mobile
equipment, especially diesel generators needed in case of total loss of power,
external events or severe accident situations, are already available in 7 coun-
tries, and will be installed in most of the others.
In April 2012, the Commission and ENSREG agreed to examine some safety aspects
in more detail and prepare a follow-up for the following months.76 The follow-up
activities took place through an Action Plan of the ENSREG that was adopted on 1
August 2012, ensuring that the recommendations and suggestions from the stress-
test peer reviews would be addressed by national regulators and ENSREG in a
consistent manner. On 10 May 2012, the Commission presented an EAEC Report
which considered the main topics arising after the Fukushima accident.77
In October 2012, the Commission released the results of the stress tests in a Commu-
nication on the comprehensive risk and safety assessments (‘stress tests’) of nuclear
power plants in the EU and related activities.78 This communication was accompa-
nied by a Commission Staff Working Document: ‘Technical Summary on the imple-
mentation of comprehensive risk and safety assessments of nuclear power plants in
the EU.’79
In November 2012, the European Parliament presented a Draft Motion for a Resolu-
tion on risk and safety assessments (‘stress tests’) of nuclear power plants in the EU
and related activities.80 No fewer than 161 amendments related to this four-page
Draft Motion for a Resolution were proposed on 3 December 2012.81 In March 2013,
the European Parliament Resolution on risk and safety assessments (‘stress tests’) of
nuclear power plants in the EU and related activities82 was adopted after a single
reading. 83
4.2. The results of the stress tests
The stress tests have confirmed that there are not only still differences between the
EU Member States in ensuring comprehensive and transparent identification and
management of key safety issues, but also significant gaps. Strengthened Euratom
76 See Joint statement of the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) and the European Commis-
sion.
77 See European Atomic Energy Community Report – Second Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) Extraordi-
nary Meeting – Vienna, 27-31 August 2012 – C(2012) 3196 final – 10.5.2012.
78 See communication on the comprehensive risk and safety assessments (‘stress tests’) of nuclear power
plants in the EU and related activities, 4.10.2012 – COM(2012) 571 final.
79 See SWD Technical Summary on the implementation of comprehensive risk and safety assessments of
nuclear power plants in the EU – SWD(2012) 287 final – 4.10.2012.
80 See European Parliament document PE497.899v01-00, 6.11.2012.
81 See European Parliament document PE500.594v01-00, 3.12.2012.
82 See European Parliament document T7-0089/2013, 14.3.2013.
83 See European Parliament document B7-0086/2013, 5.3.2013.
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legislation could include a set of technical provisions at an appropriate level of detail
for a framework legal instrument. These provisions should ensure a common EU
approach to nuclear safety.84
The most striking conclusion appears, paradoxically, in an assessment report issued
by the Commission concerning the new draft Nuclear Safety Directive. It reflects the
incredible persistence of essential and highly dangerous problems:
Although triggered by an earthquake and tsunami of an immense magnitude,
investigations of the causes of the accident reveal a range of foreseeable
factors which combined to produce a catastrophic outcome. The analysis of
the Fukushima accident reveals quite substantial, and recurring technical
issues as well as persistent institutional failures similar to the ones from the
post-accident evaluations of the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl nuclear
accidents decades ago.85
This throws quite a harsh light on the extent of the present challenge.
In term of cost, significant gains in safety at least for some NPPs in some Member
States would cost around €200 million per reactor unit following the stress test
reports. For all the 132 operating reactors in 14 EU Member States, this means a total
of approximately €26 billion. According to an OECD/NEA Study on the Economics of
Long Term Operation of NPPS published in 2012, some European countries reported
an estimated additional post-Fukushima investment cost increase of around 10% for
long-term operation investments for the next 15 years.86
This must be integrated into a more general rise in nuclear costs. Construction costs
are a key determinant of the final nuclear electricity generating costs and many
projects are significantly over budget. Investment cost estimates have increased in
the past decade or so from US$1,000 to around US$8,000 per installed kilowatt. … In
some countries (including France, Germany, the US and Sweden), historically low
inflation-adjusted operating costs – especially for major repairs – have escalated so
rapidly that the average reactor’s operating cost is barely below, or even exceeds,
the normal band of wholesale power prices.87
84 See SWD Executive Summary of the Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a Council
Directive amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear
safety of nuclear installations – SWD(2013) 200 final – 13.6.2013, p. 4.
85 SWD (2013) 422, p. 3.
86 OECD/NEA, 2012, Study on the Economics of Long Term Operation of NPPs, A. Lokhov, R. Cameron, IAEA-
CN-194-005.
87 M. Schneider and A. Froggatt, The world nuclear industry status report 2014, SES/H. Boll Foundation, 2014,
p. 8.
A very interesting analysis about the costs of the nuclear power sector was launched in 2012 by the French
Court of Auditors, and updated in 2014: http://www.ccomptes.fr/Presse/Communiques-de-presse/Les-
couts-de-la-filiere-electro-nucleaire.
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The distribution of this additional cost, ranged across the different NPPs in the
different Member States, can only be assessed on the basis of the National Action
Plans, which will describe the implementation of the recommendations from the
stress-tests peer review process at national level, and which were due to be
submitted to the Commission by the end of 2012 (to be peer reviewed in early 2013).
However, the stress-test peer reviews showed that (1) improvement measures are
required at all NPP sites; (2) for many reactor units only relatively minor improve-
ment measures need to be implemented; and (3) more substantial effort is required
for the implementation of the available solutions and for development in only a
handful of cases.88
4.3. The parallel security review
After the European Council of March 2011, on a parallel path, an Ad Hoc Group on
Nuclear security was also established to make the security review. The group was
meant to deal ‘with security of the nuclear power plants in EU in relation to theft,
sabotage, unauthorised access, unauthorised movement of nuclear material or other
malicious act.’ So, safety and security followed two different institutional paths, and
security was deemed to fall exclusively under the competence of the Member
States.89
The group’s report was presented to the Council on 31 May 2012.90 Simply put, the
group did not concentrate on specific Member States or situations, but on methods
for evaluating, taking preventive measures and protecting NPPs. Its main goal was to
identify and share good practices and consider possible ways to improve the general
security principles based on the nuclear security recommendations of the IAEA. The
report identified 32 good practices (set out in the report’s Annex I). They can be
grouped into two broad categories: those which relate to the national legal and
regulatory framework, and those which relate to the implementation and mainte-
nance of a nuclear security regime.91
88 See SWD Impact assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive amending Direc-
tive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations
– SWD(2013) 199 final (part 1/2) – 13.6.2013, p. 35.
89 This approach deserves to be noted, considering that general security problems are also covered by the EU
Treaty, in the framework of police and justice cooperation. For example, the group covered ‘the threat of
nuclear terrorism.’ As a matter of fact, ‘the fight against terrorism’ has been defined as one of the objec-
tives of the EU internal security initiatives (Art. 74 TFEU).
90 Doc. 10616/12/AHGNS 20.
91 For a detailed description, see I. Anthony, ‘The role of the EU in strengthening nuclear security’, Non Prolif-
eration Papers 32, 2013.
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5. THE 2014/87/EURATOM DIRECTIVE ON THE
SAFETY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS
5.1. The 2013 proposal
In June 2013, the Commission presented a Draft Proposal for a Council Directive
amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for
the nuclear safety of nuclear installations.92 This draft proposal was accompanied by
three Staff Working Documents.93
The proposed amendments aimed to enhance the regulatory framework for nuclear
safety in the EU, in particular by
• strengthening the role and effective independence of the national regulatory
authorities;
• enhancing transparency on nuclear safety matters;
• strengthening principles, and introducing new general nuclear safety objectives
and requirements, addressing specific technical issues across the entire life cycle
of nuclear installations, particularly NPPs;
• reinforcing monitoring and exchange of experiences, by establishing a European
system of peer reviews; and
• establishing a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonized nuclear safety
guidelines.
As stated in Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty, the Commission consulted the
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) to obtain its opinion on the draft
proposal. The EESC positively welcomed the proposed amendments to the Nuclear
Safety Directive, and its opinion was adopted during its 492nd plenary session in
September 2013.94
In 2013, the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council Directive amending Direc-
tive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety
of nuclear installations.95 This proposal was accompanied by four Staff Working
Documents.96 One of these staff working documents is a study called Ex-ante evalu-
92 See European Commission Draft Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM
establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations – COM(2013) 343 final –
13.6.2013.
93 See SWDs accompanying the document Draft Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2009/71/
EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations – SWD(2013)
199 final, SWD(2013) 200 final and SWD(2013) 201 final – 13.6.2013.
94 See EESC document TEN/529 – Revision of the nuclear safety directive – 18 September 2013 – http://
www.eesc.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.ten-opinions&itemCode=29108.
95 See Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community
framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations – COM(2013) 715 final – 17.10.2013.
96 See SWDs accompanying the document Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2009/71/
EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations – SWD(2013)
422 final, SWD(2013) 423 final, SWD(2013) 424 final and SWD(2013) 425 final – 17.10.2013.
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ation of competitiveness impacts of the Commission’s policy proposal on the revision
of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) nuclear safety legislative
framework.
This proposal provoked several rounds of examination by the Working Party on
Atomic Questions (WPAQ).97 In April 2014, the Parliament adopted, within the
framework of a special legislative procedure (consultation of Parliament), a legisla-
tive resolution on the proposal for a Council directive amending Directive 2009/71/
EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear
installations.98
5.2. The final text adopted by the Council
In July 2014, Directive 2014/87 Euratom was adopted by the Council.99 It establishes
an EU system of peer review which will be enacted every six years from 2017
onwards. The new text also encourages cooperation, coordination and information
exchanges between the safety authorities of neighbouring Member States located
near any plant where an accident takes place. At least once every ten years, Member
States must organize a regular self-assessment of their national framework and
competent regulatory authorities, and they must request an international peer
review of the relevant segments of their national framework and competent regula-
tory authorities. Member States, except those without nuclear installations, must
guarantee that the national framework requires on-site emergency and prepared-
ness and response arrangements, and that there is consistency and continuity
between those arrangements set by the national framework and those required
under Directive 2013/59/EURATOM.100 Member States have to transmit a report to
the Commission on the implementation of the Directive 2009/71 by 22 July 2014, and
must transmit another one by 22 July 2020. This Directive’s provisions must be trans-
posed into national law within three years.
To strengthen the role and effective independence of the national regulatory
authorities, Member States must establish a national framework which provides for
‘the allocation of responsibilities and coordination between relevant state bodies’
(Article 4, paragraph 1 (a)), and ‘for a system of regulatory control of nuclear safety
performed by the competent regulatory authority’ (Article 4, paragraph 1 (d)).
Member States must establish and maintain a competent regulatory authority in the
97 The WPAQ forms part of EU cooperation within the areas of nuclear radiation and radiation protection, and
handles all legal and technical initiatives within the nuclear field. This committee is comprised of highly
specialist experts on atomic safety issues from the 28 Member States.
98 See P7_TA(2014)0274.
99 OJ EU L 219, 25.7.2014, pp. 42-52.
See the consolidated version of Directive 2009/71: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/
?uri=CELEX:02009L0071-20140814&qid=1419259323368&from=EN.
100 OJ EU L 13, 17.1.2014, pp. 1-73.
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field of nuclear safety of nuclear installations (Article 5, paragraph 1). They should
also ‘ensure the effective independence from undue influence of the competent
regulatory authority in its regulatory decision making.’ Therefore, the national
framework must require that the competent regulatory authority a) is functionally
separate from any other body or organization concerned with the promotion or utili-
zation of nuclear energy; b) takes regulatory decisions; c) is given dedicated and
appropriate budget allocations to allow the delivery of its regulatory tasks; d)
employs an appropriate number of staff with qualifications, experience and exper-
tise necessary to fulfil its obligations; e) establishes procedures for the prevention
and resolution of any conflicts of interest; and f) provides nuclear safety-related
information without clearance from any other body or organization (Article 5,
paragraph 2).
Member States should also guarantee that ‘the competent regulatory authority is
given the legal powers necessary to fulfil its obligations in connection with the
national framework.’ Therefore the national framework must entrust the competent
regulatory authority with the chief regulatory tasks, namely a) proposing, defining or
participating in the definition of national nuclear safety requirements; b) requiring
that the licence holder complies and demonstrates compliance with national nuclear
safety requirements and the terms of the relevant licence; c) verifying the compli-
ance through regulatory assessments and inspections; and d) proposing or carrying
out effective and proportionate actions (Article 5, paragraph 3).
To enhance transparency on nuclear safety matters, Member States must
guarantee that ‘necessary information in relation to nuclear safety of nuclear instal-
lations and its regulation is made available to workers and the general public, with
specific consideration to local authorities, population and stakeholders in the vicinity
of a nuclear installation,’ including ‘information on normal operating conditions of
nuclear installations’ and ‘prompt information in case of incidents and accidents’ for
workers and the general public. Furthermore, prompt information concerning
incidents or accidents must be provided to the competent regulatory authorities of
other Member States in the vicinity of the nuclear installations concerned (Article 8,
paragraph 1). The scope of national restrictions has thus been somewhat reduced.
To strengthen principles, and introduce new general nuclear safety objectives and
requirements, address specific technical issues across the entire life cycle of
nuclear installations and in particular NPPs, the national framework will provide
national nuclear safety requirements covering all stages of the life cycle of nuclear
installations. The national framework should also provide a system of licensing and
prohibition of operations of nuclear installations without a licence (Article 4,
paragraph 1 (b) and (c)). Member States have to ensure that the national framework
is maintained and improved when appropriate (Article 4, paragraph 2). The national
framework must require that ‘the prime responsibility for the nuclear safety of a
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nuclear installation rests with the licence holder’ – a responsibility that cannot be
delegated. The applicant, ‘when applying for a licence, is required to submit a
demonstration of nuclear safety.’ Licence holders must ‘regularly assess, verify and
continuously improve’ the nuclear safety of their nuclear installation. Measures must
be in place for ‘the prevention of accidents and mitigation of the consequences of
accidents.’ License holders must ‘establish and implement management systems
which give due priority to nuclear safety’, provide for ‘appropriate on-site emergency
procedures and arrangements’ – including severe accidents management – provide
for and maintain ‘financial and human resources with appropriate qualifications and
competences, necessary to fulfil their obligations with respect to the nuclear safety
of a nuclear installation’ (Article 6). In order to obtain, maintain and further develop
expertise and skills in nuclear safety and on-site emergency preparedness, all parties
are required to ‘make arrangements for education and training’ for staff who have
responsibilities relating to the nuclear safety of the nuclear installation (Article 7).
Article 8a sets nuclear safety objectives for nuclear installations and states that
Member States must guarantee that the national framework requires that existing
nuclear installations and nuclear installations for which a construction licence is
granted for the first time are ‘designed, sited, constructed, commissioned, operated
and decommissioned’ with the objective of preventing and mitigating the conse-
quences of accidents. To implement these objectives, where defence-in-depth
applies, the national framework must be applied to ensure a minimization of the
impact of extreme natural and unintended man-made hazards, to prevent abnormal
operations and failures, to control abnormal operation and detect failures, to control
accidents within the design basis, to control severe conditions. Also, to achieve the
nuclear safety objectives, the national framework must require that the competent
regulatory authority and the licence holder ‘take measures to promote and enhance
an effective nuclear safety culture’ (Article 8b). Member States should also
guarantee that the national framework requires that any grant of a licence to
construct a new nuclear installation or operate an existing nuclear installation, ‘is
based upon an appropriate site- and installation-specific assessment, comprising a
nuclear safety demonstration,’ and that the licence holder, ‘under the regulatory
control of the competent regulatory authority,’ reassesses at least every ten years,
the safety of the nuclear installation (Article 8c). The national framework structure
for on-site emergency preparedness and response must be ‘established with a clear
allocation of responsibilities and coordination between the licence holder’ and
competent authorities or organizations, ‘taking into account all phases of an
emergency’ (Article 8d, paragraph 1).
To reinforce monitoring and exchange of experiences by establishing a European
system of peer reviews, with the aim of continuously improving nuclear safety,
Member States ‘shall, at least every ten years, arrange for periodic self-assessments
of their national framework and competent regulatory authorities and invite an
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international peer review’ (Article 8e). The outcomes of these peer reviews must be
reported to the other Member States and to the Commission. Member States must
ensure that a national assessment related to nuclear safety of the relevant nuclear
installation on their territory is performed, that ‘all other Member States, and the
Commission as observer, are invited to peer review’ that national assessment, that
‘appropriate follow-up measures are taken of relevant findings’ resulting from the
peer reviews, and that relevant reports are published when results are available.
Topical peer reviews must take place at least every six years starting in 2017. In case
of an accident leading to a situation that requires off-site emergency measures, the
Member State concerned must guarantee that ‘an international peer review is
invited without undue delay.’
To establish a mechanism for developing EU-wide harmonized nuclear safety
guidelines, Member States will ensure that the competent regulatory authorities
exchange or share information on the nuclear safety of nuclear installations with the
competent regulatory authorities of other Member States in the vicinity of those
nuclear installations (Article 8, paragraph 3).
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CONCLUSIONS
The Fukushima catastrophe has had a major effect on the future of nuclear energy
everywhere, and especially in Europe. An important, and additional element is that,
unlike the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl plants, the Japanese plant continues to
leak irradiated components nearly four years after the tsunami.
Japan’s economic fate since 2011 can be seen as a cautionary tale. The instantaneous
removal of nuclear energy from its power supply system has been expensive. The
trade balance has swung aggressively from surplus to deficit, and this remains a
persistent problem. Obviously, the relaunch of the post-financial-crash Japanese
economy has suffered from this. Consequently, the Abe government has tried to
reopen some nuclear power plants. Local populations, however, tend to see things
differently. Despite this, it is interesting to note that a gubernatorial election in
March 2014 covering this question fell to the pro-nuclear partisans.
This new crisis has in any case provoked a welcome reappraisal of the requirements
of nuclear safety in Europe. There is a strong parallel between the work of the IAEA
and the EU. In the context of the development of international nuclear law, what is
noted is probably no different to other fields of law, in that while progressive devel-
opments may take place, the majority of such developments have occurred in
response to an initiating event such as the 1986 Chernobyl accident, or the tragic
events on 11 September 2011 in the United States with its implications for nuclear
security. In a similar way, the Fukushima Daiichi accident is playing an important
catalytic role in the further development of international nuclear law.101
In a nutshell, the adoption of Directive 2009/71/EURATOM had provoked a lot of
resistance (which explains the exceptional length of an unusually simple legislative
procedure). Important restrictions had been introduced, but the new Directive 2014/
87/EURATOM has abandoned some of them. It has also tried to take into considera-
tion the main lessons of the catastrophe. In so doing, it has slightly enhanced the
safety principles (without establishing standards), increased the national regulators’
independence, strengthened transparency, and improved the control processes.
Euratom, however, remains a specific legal area where the role of Parliament and
Commission is weaker, competences are more narrowly interpreted, and the synergy
between European and international authorities continues to be complex.
101 P. L. Johnson, ‘The post-Fukushima Daiichi response: The role of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in
strengthening the legal framework for nuclear safety’, Nuclear Law Bulletin, 2013/1, p. 16.
